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Abstract
Classical and quantum field theory provide not only realistic exam-
ples of extant notions of empirical equivalence, but also new notions
of empirical equivalence, both modal and occurrent. A simple but
modern gravitational case goes back to the 1890s, but there has been
apparently total neglect of the simplest relativistic analog, with the
result that an erroneous claim has taken root that Special Relativity
could not have accommodated gravity even if there were no bend-
ing of light. The fairly recent acceptance of nonzero neutrino masses
shows that widely neglected possibilities for nonzero particle masses
have sometimes been vindicated. In the electromagnetic case, there is
permanent underdetermination at the classical and quantum levels be-
tween Maxwell’s theory and the one-parameter family of Proca’s elec-
tromagnetisms with massive photons, which approximate Maxwell’s
theory in the limit of zero photon mass. While Yang-Mills theories
display similar approximate equivalence classically, quantization typ-
ically breaks this equivalence. A possible exception, including unified
electroweak theory, might permit a mass term for the photons but not
the Yang-Mills vector bosons. Underdetermination between massive
and massless (Einstein) gravity even at the classical level is subject to
contemporary controversy.
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1 Introduction
The question whether there exist empirically indistinguishable but in-
compatible theories bears on how tightly empirical constraints from
the progress of science might constrain our theorizing. While the issue
of empirical equivalence has been widely discussed, philosophers’ dis-
cussions often have involved rather thin examples, perhaps generating
new theory candidates by de-Ockhamizing (replacing one theoretical
entity, perhaps “force,” by some combination of multiple entities such
that only that combination plays a role in the theory, such as “gorce
plus morce” [Glymour, 1977]), unmotivated deletion of some regions
of space-time or objects therein while the remainder behaves just as
in the mother theory [Ellis, 1985, Clendinnen, 1989, Dejnozka, 1995,
Musgrave, 1992, Norton, 2009], and the like [Kukla, 1998]. P. Kyle
Stanford argues that resorting to these sorts of examples of under-
determination that philosophers employ, whether algorithmic or not,
is a “devil’s bargain for defenders of underdetermination, for it suc-
ceeds only where it gives up any significant and distinctive general
challenge to the truth of our best scientific theories” by collapsing
scientific underdetermination into the familiar and perhaps insolu-
ble problem of radical skepticism [Stanford, 2006, p. 12]. While
there are interesting issues in the vicinity of those examples, per-
haps more interesting and certainly more novel examples are avail-
able in contemporary physics in the context of field theory. To be
more specific, scalar gravity, spinor theories of neutrinos, Maxwell’s
electromagnetism, Yang-Mills fields, and Einstein’s GR, along with
their massive relatives, with or without quantization, give examples a
number of interesting meta-theoretic phenomena, including the insta-
bility of empirical equivalence under change of auxiliary hypotheses
[Laudan and Leplin, 1991, Leplin, 1997]. Some of these phenomena
have been anticipated in the philosophical literature but without such
interesting instantiations; others might not have been contemplated
previously by philosophers.
Empirical equivalence is an issue that plays a key role in arguments
about scientific realism. According to Andre´ Kukla,
[t]he main argument for antirealism is undoubtedly the ar-
gument from the underdetermination of theory by all pos-
sible data. Here is one way to represent it: (1) all theories
have indefinitely many empirically equivalent rivals; (2) em-
pirically equivalent hypotheses are equally believable; (3)
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therefore, belief in any theory must be arbitrary and un-
founded. [Kukla, 1998, p. 58].
On the question whether there exist incompatible but empirically
equivalent theories, so that theories are underdetermined by data, a
large literature exists, but presently there seems to be considerable
disagreement on various points. By “empirical equivalence” I have
in mind (unless otherwise qualified) precise equivalence for all mod-
els—not equivalence that might be broken with further experimental
progress or the introduction of differing auxiliary hypotheses, or equiv-
alence that holds in some but not all physically possible worlds. When
I speak of approximate empirical equivalence, once again all models,
not just some, are in view. During the heyday of logical empiricism,
many influential people denied that distinct and incompatible but em-
pirically equivalent theories existed [Glymour, 1970]. Carnap and Re-
ichenbach had no room empirically equivalent theories, given the ver-
ificationist criterion of meaning [Carnap, 1959]. But not only Quine’s
work [Quine, 1975], but also the revival of scientific realism during
the 1960s-70s, led to a revival of belief that distinct and incompatible
but empirically equivalent theories exist. More recently the view that
there do exist rival empirically equivalent theories has been somewhat
widely held [Musgrave, 1992, Kukla, 1993, Earman, 2006], in contrast
to the earlier positivist view that empirically equivalent theories say
the same thing and so are merely linguistic variants. This work aspires
to address the question of empirically equivalent theories within the
context of local classical and (to some degree) quantum field theories.
Classical and quantum field theories provide philosophically inter-
esting test cases for both approximate and exact empirical equiva-
lence of physical theories. This paper considers approximate empiri-
cal equivalence using massless and massive versions of scalar gravity,
neutrinos, Maxwell’s electromagnetism, Yang-Mills field theories (de-
scribing the weak and strong nuclear forces), and Einstein’s GR. By
“massive theories,” I have in mind the standard particle physics-based
sense, with some abuse of language, such that the theories’ equations
of motion (using the standard potentials, such as appear in the usual
Lagrangian density, as variables) have a term that is algebraic and lin-
ear in the potential (and no zeroth-order constant term). If a massless
scalar field φ typically satisfies the relativistic wave equation
c−2
∂2φ
∂t2
− ∂
2φ
∂x2
= 0, (1)
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then a massive scalar field satisfies the Klein-Gordon equation
c−2
∂2φ
∂t2
− ∂
2φ
∂x2
+m2c2h¯−2φ = 0. (2)
The coefficient of the algebraic term has been written as m2c2h¯−2 in
anticipation of the use of relativistic quantum field theory. In units
with Planck’s constant (reduced by 2pi) h¯ and the ‘speed of light’ c
set to 1 (which I use below), it becomes clear why the phrase “mass
term” is used. For a classical theory, the ‘mass term’ involves not a
mass, but an inverse length scale. In a quantum context, Planck’s con-
stant can be used to convert the length-related scale to a mass scale.
The length then corresponds to the Compton wavelength. The Klein-
Gordon equation and other massive field theories with Lagrangian
densities have quadratic terms in the potential. Under quantization
(if all goes well), the quanta of fields satisfying the Klein-Gordon equa-
tion, such as photons according to Proca’s massive electromagnetism,
have a nonzero rest mass; then light does not travel at the ‘speed
of light.’ The fact that light need not travel at the speed of light
sounds paradoxical, but only if one is misled by the distorting char-
acter of older operationalist presentations of relativistic physics. How
fast light actually travels and the ‘speed of light’ constant c in Lorentz
transformations need not be equal.
At the classical level, at least the simpler massive theory families
have representatives that approximate their massless relatives arbi-
trarily well empirically for sufficiently small mass parameters, but the
theoretical properties of massive theories can differ greatly from those
of their massless counterparts, except in the scalar case (and perhaps
the spin 1
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case, for which the above discussion would require modi-
fication to discuss the first-order Dirac equation). For example, the
massless electromagnetic, Yang-Mills and gravitational theories—the
last of these being Einstein’s General Relativity (GR) or at any rate a
theory with Einstein’s field equations—have mathematically indeter-
ministic field equations and gauge freedom, whereas the massive the-
ories in the standard formulation have deterministic field equations.
The fact that the mass of the photon (or vector boson or graviton,
mutatis mutandis) is a free parameter shows that Proca’s massive
electromagnetism is not one theory, but an infinite family of theories,
one for each choice of value for the photon mass. This example there-
fore exemplifies permanent rather than transient underdetermination.
However, there is no possibility of identifying supposedly rival theories
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as really the same theory, because all theories involved (Maxwell’s and
the various massive electromagnetic theories, for example) are empir-
ically inequivalent. Under quantization, the massive electromagnetic
theory remains healthy and continues to approximate its massless rel-
ative arbitrarily well, thus giving an example of underdetermination
in a significant quantum field theory.
The quantized massive Yang-Mills theories (excepting theories
with the mass term pertaining to an Abelian sector) and quan-
tized gravitational theories are theoretically problematic, and some
argue that classical massive gravity is also defective. This phe-
nomenon of a good classical theory that goes bad under quantiza-
tion resembles or exemplifies Laudan and Leplin’s notion of insta-
bility of empirical equivalence under change of auxiliary hypotheses
[Laudan and Leplin, 1991, Leplin, 1997]. Here I have in mind taking
quantization (or the lack thereof) as something like an auxiliary hy-
pothesis combined somehow with one of the above mentioned field
theories, construed in some skeletal form that is neither classical nor
quantum.
Explicit and fairly realistic physical theories interrelated through
advanced mathematics should yield insights not as readily available
from the traditional discussions of abstract theory formulations T1
and T2 related by simple logical formulas. Earman has made a similar
point in the context of determinism:
If philosophers had spent less time trying to achieve for
determinism the superficial ‘precision’ afforded by for-
mal symbolic notation and had spent more time study-
ing the content of physical theories they might have con-
fronted the truly fascinating substantive challenges that de-
terminism must face in classical and relativistic physics.
[Earman, 1986, p. 21]
The fruitfulness of particle physics for the question of underde-
termination reinforces the importance, recently urged by others
[Brown, 2005, Ladyman et al., 2007], of doing the philosophy of real
physics in its detail and richness.
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2 Types of Inexact Empirical Equiva-
lence
The most common version of empirical equivalence discussed by
philosophers is the case of exact empirical equivalence for all models
of two theories. The potential interest of such a scenario is evident:
obviously there is no chance in any nomologically possible world that
experimental progress will resolve the debate, while settling it on the-
oretical grounds might also be difficult. However, this scenario runs
the risk that the two supposedly rival theories are in fact one and the
same theory in different guises. Such identification was often made
by those influenced by logical empiricism. A related weaker claim is
made today by John Norton, namely, that for theories for which the
“observational equivalence can be demonstrated by arguments brief
enough to be included in a journal article . . . we cannot preclude the
possibility that the theories are merely variant formulations of the
same theory.” [Norton, 2008, p. 17] Norton evidently has in mind
journal articles in the philosophy of science, not physics or some other
science [Norton, 2008, p. 33]. While Norton aims to deny that the
underdetermination of theories by data is generic and that philoso-
phers’ algorithmic rivals carry much force, I aim to show that there
are some serious candidates for underdetermination that arise from
within real physics and that have not been discussed much, if at all,
by philosophers. Thus there is no real disagreement, except perhaps
an emphasis on whether a glass of water is partly empty or partly
full. I make no inductive claim (which Norton would dispute) that
these examples imply that all theories are always underdetermined by
evidence. However, the examples available from real physics do seem
sufficiently widespread and interesting that it might well frequently be
the case that scientific, or rather physical, theories are permanently
underdetermined by data. It is therefore helpful to observe that the
physics literature suggests by example several slightly weaker notions
of empirical equivalence that, being weaker, are immune to the strat-
egy of being identified as one and the same theory and hence not rivals,
yet strong enough that there is no realistic prospect for distinguishing
the two theories empirically.
Among philosophers the question has been raised what to make
of the many empirically equivalent (or nearly equivalent) theory-
candidates or formulations in gravitation, both for Newtonian grav-
ity and for theories employing Einstein’s equations [Jones, 1991,
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Lyre and Eynck, 2003, Bain, 2004]. Are the several Newtonian (or
Einsteinian) theory-candidates just formulations of the same theory,
or are they rivals? If they are rivals, are some of these theories better
than others? Especially because some versions of both the Newtonian
and Einsteinian gravities have flat space-time with absolute objects
and a gravitational force, while others employ curved space-time, the
theory candidates’ ontologies and explanatory mechanisms vary rather
widely, despite the complete or nearly complete empirical equivalence
between the two approaches. This choice takes up the issue (discussed
by Lotze [Russell, 1897], Poincare´ [Poincare´, 1902] and Reichenbach
[Reichenbach, 1928]) of the equivalence between curved geometry and
flat geometry with universal forces.
The particle physics literature since the 1930s, however,
takes up the issue in a more detailed and vastly more phys-
ically plausible way in the context of gravitation, based on
compelling principles of special relativistic field theory such
as (of course) Lorentz invariance and the absence of negative-
energy degrees of freedom [Fierz and Pauli, 1939, Rosen, 1940,
Papapetrou, 1948, Wentzel, 1949, Gupta, 1954, Kraichnan, 1955,
Thirring, 1961, Halpern, 1963, Tonnelat, 1965, Feynman et al., 1995,
Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965, Weinberg, 1965,
Sexl, 1967, Sexl, 1970, Deser, 1970, van Nieuwenhuizen, 1973,
Groenewold, 1974, Boulware and Deser, 1975, Boulware et al., 1979,
Fang and Fronsdal, 1979, Cavalleri and Spinelli, 1980,
Logunov and Mestvirishvili, 1991, Pitts and Schieve, 2001,
Boulanger and Esole, 2002, Zee, 2003]. I point out that this work
extends and completes the physical leg of Einstein’s double strategy
in pursuit of his field equations [Einstein and Grossmann, 1913].
The physical leg of Einstein’s double strategy involved, besides an
analogy to electromagnetism, a quest for gravitational field equations
given by some second-order differential operator equated to the total
stress-energy, including gravitational stress-energy, with the gravita-
tional equations by themselves entailing stress-energy conservation.
Einstein’s equations are in fact logically equivalent to a suitable
collection of such laws [Anderson, 1967], corresponding to the conser-
vation of uncountably many energy-momenta [Pitts, 2009b]. While
Einstein retrospectively described his physical strategy as a failure,
recent historical scholarship has called attention to its importance
[Norton, 1989, Janssen, 2005, Janssen and Renn, 2007], though with-
out noticing the connection to later particle physics work. (Particle
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physicists generally have not noticed, either.) It is worth noting that
philosophers’ assessments of conventionality in geometry, especially
the negative assessment common since the 1970s [Putnam, 1975],
generally did not keep up with developments in particle physics since
1938. It is also noteworthy that a wholehearted to commitment
to thinking of gravitation geometrically tends to constrict the
imagination by rendering it nearly impossible to conceive of the
massive variants of GR to be considered below. By contrast, particle
physicists’ viewing Einstein’s equations as describing a self-interacting
spin 2 field immediately suggests that the question whether a massive
spin 2 theory might also yield interesting theories of gravity. This
question was indeed pursued from that time [Fierz and Pauli, 1939,
Tonnelat, 1941a, Tonnelat, 1941b, Petiau, 1941b, Petiau, 1941a,
Tonnelat, 1942, de Broglie, 1943, Tonnelat, 1943, Petiau, 1943a,
Petiau, 1943b, Tonnelat, 1944a, Tonnelat, 1944b, Tonnelat, 1944c,
Petiau, 1944a, Petiau, 1944b, Petiau, 1945]. Thus the question of
massive vs. massless spin 2 theories of gravity as a test case for
underdetermination has reached philosophers 70 years after it became
a common theme in particle physics. A mind-set that obscures
interesting questions for seven decades is worth challenging. It is
therefore appropriate to call philosophers’ attention to the particle
physics tradition via the extensive citations above.
In any case, the many different prima facie ontologies for
gravitation with Einstein’s field equations might embarrass scien-
tific realists, who presumably wish to invest the fields used with
(meta)physical significance. An incomplete list of formulations
found in the literature on GR (construed in the physicists’ broad
and vague sense) reveals a host formulations in terms of different
variables and even different numbers of variables. For curved
space-time Einsteinian formulations, there are still many different
choices of primitive fields from which to choose, with different
numbers of components. To mention just some (excluding spinor
formulations, for example), one has the typical metric formulation
(itself non-unique in Lagrangian density between, e.g. the Hilbert
R Lagrangian density with second derivatives of the metric and the
Einstein ΓΓ Lagrangian density merely quadratic in the Christoffel
symbols,1 and other choices [Pons, 2003] for example, as well as in
1In the last few decades [Regge and Teitelboim, 1974], physicists have become less cav-
alier about discarding boundary terms and regarding Lagrangians differing by divergences
as equivalent. Boundary terms are related to the functional differentiability of the Hamil-
8
the choice of variables between the metric gµν, its inverse g
µν, and
uncountably many densitized relatives of each); the ADM 3 + 1 split
with a spatial metric hij = gij (lower case Latin indices running from
1 to 3), lapse function N and shift vector βi [Misner et al., 1973];
Ashtekar’s “new variables” for the modern canonical quantum gravity
project (a densitized triad-connection version of an ADM split)
[Ashtekar and Lewandowski, 2004, Jacobson and Romano, 1992];
Christian Møller’s orthonormal tetrad formalism [Møller, 1964]; the
Einstein-‘Palatini’ metric-connection formalism (which is not due
to Palatini [Ferraris et al., 1982]); a metric-connection-Lagrange
multiplier formalism that explains why the metric-connection for-
malism works [Ray, 1975, Kichenassamy, 1986, Lindstro¨m, 1988]; a
tetrad-connection formalism that derives rather than postulates the
vanishing of the connection’s torsion [Papapetrou and Stachel, 1978];
and the Peres-Katanaev conformal metric density-scalar density
formalism [Peres, 1963, Katanaev, 2005]. This last set of variables,
though rarely used and little known, turns out to be privileged for
Anderson’s absolute objects project because it uses no irrelevant
fields (in a fairly well defined sense) and uses only irreducible
geometric objects; the failure to use such variables leads to bad
performance in inspecting GR for absolute objects [Pitts, 2006],
as appeared above. Roger Jones identified four formulations of
Newtonian gravity; with so many choices of fields from which to
choose even within geometrical approaches to Einstein’s equations,
as well as (for example) both geometrical and “spin 2” options
[Lyre and Eynck, 2003, Pitts and Schieve, 2004] (and the long list
above), one sympathizes with Jones’s question “realism about what?”
[Jones, 1991]. In what should the scientific realist believe in order to
be a realist about gravitation in light of current physics? Ernan Mc-
Mullin’s claim (with which Stanford sympathizes [Stanford, 2006, p.
16]) that mechanics and theoretical physics generally are anomalously
difficult for scientific realism [McMullin, 1991] has some basis.
Apart from some exceptions of perhaps little physical importance
(such as solutions of an Ashtekar formulation with a degenerate met-
ric, for example), the various sets of variables for GR (broadly con-
strued in the fashion of physicists) are empirically equivalent in the
sense that all or most solutions of one set of equations are suitably
related (not always one-to-one) with solutions in other sets of vari-
tonian, so a choice of boundary terms imposes boundary conditions and hence limits the
models included by the theory.
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ables. Physicists are generally not tempted to regard the resulting
theory formulations as distinct theories, partly because their crite-
ria for physical reality are attuned to this mathematical interrelation.
Each description comes with an adequate recipe for distinguishing the
physically meaningful from the descriptive fluff, and no further onto-
logical questions are typically asked or answered. Physicists are also
quite comfortable with a certain amount of vagueness or merely im-
plicit specificity. For example, is a given energy condition, such as the
weak energy condition [Wald, 1984], part of GR or not? The answer
to that question depends, at least, on whether ‘realistic’ matter fields
satisfy the condition; but whether a certain kind of matter is realistic
is malleable in light of both empirical factors (such as the apparent
observation of dark energy in the late 1990s [Riess and et al., 1998])
and theoretical factors (such as recognition that seemingly tame mat-
ter fields or quantum fields violate an energy condition hitherto re-
garded as important) [Barcelo and Visser, 2002]. GR for physicists is
in effect a cluster of theories sharing a hard core including Einstein’s
equations, while partially overlapping in including or failing to include
various additional claims with various degrees of importance, not un-
like a Lakatosian research program [Lakatos, 1970, Lakatos, 1971] (see
also [Ellis, 2007]).2 Perhaps Arthur Fine would commend to philoso-
phers the physicists’ approach, which sounds something like his Nat-
ural Ontological Attitude that there is no distinctively philosophical
question about the real existence of entities employed in scientific the-
ories, so neither realism nor anti-realism is an appropriate doctrine
[Fine, 1986]. Physicists typically assume some sort of mathemati-
cal equivalence as necessary and sufficient for two formulations to be
the same theory (though strict equivalence is not always required).
Lawrence Sklar discusses a strategy along these lines, which seems
not unreasonable if we have no familiarity with the theory’s entities
2Another possible view is to identify GR with Einstein’s equations, and allow the vari-
ous further specifications to count as sectors within GR. Such a view has the consequence,
it would seem, of making the ontology of GR indeterminate without specifying which sec-
tor one has in mind, which seems unhelpful. It also suggests that if some of the sectors
are physically possible, then all of them are; but one might well think that only globally
hyperbolic space-times, for example, are possible, or that they are much closer to the ac-
tual world than non-globally hyperbolic space-times. A standard job of a physical theory
is to identify physically possible and impossible worlds. Bundling together what might be
physically impossible with the physically possible in a single theory thus arguably misses
an important role for theories.
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apart from theory itself [Sklar, 1985]. If Fine’s call to abstain from
metaphysical questions goes unheeded, then the variety in choices of
fundamental variables suggests a variety of mutually incompatible on-
tologies and explanatory mechanisms. Does space-time really carry a
metric only? Does it have a set of four vector fields in terms of which
the metric can be defined (and thus make those vectors “orthonormal”
at the end of the day)? Does it have a set of orthonormal vector fields
with the extra local Lorentz group quotiented out? (What would it
be for such a thing to exist, anyway?) Does space-time carry a metric
and an a priori independent connection that happens to match “on-
shell”(that is, using some or all of the Euler-Lagrange field equations)
the torsion-free Levi-Civita connection determined by the metric? Or
is the connection simply defined in terms of the metric, so that the
modal force of its metric-compatibility and lack of torsion is logical
necessity? Similar questions could be asked about electromagnetism,
as Julian Schwinger’s least action principle, formulated in terms
of the vector potential Aµ and a priori independent field strength
Fµν [Schwinger, 1953, Arnowitt et al., 1962, Schwinger, 1998], shows.
Alan Musgrave, it should be noted, does not despair of answering
Jones’s question regarding what realists should be realists about in
gravity [Musgrave, 1992], but a full answer will require more detailed
treatment than Musgrave gives.
If one does wish to ask the metaphysician’s question about what
contemporary physical theories assert to exist, then some criterion
for choosing among the many formulations of GR is needed. On such
matters, the Andersonian tradition [Anderson, 1967, Friedman, 1983],
with some friendly amendments [Pitts, 2006], is perhaps the best guide
available, as suggested above. Anderson insisted on eliminating irrel-
evant fields. The friendly amendments insist on eliminating locally
irrelevant parts of fields—using only local sections when global sec-
tions are not needed, to use the modern bundle-speak—and using
only irreducible geometric objects. The resulting collection of fields is
such that all geometric objects needed in the theory can be derived
from the fundamental fields but not from any smaller set of fields.
The outcome for GR is that the fundamental variables are a confor-
mal metric density (or its inverse) and a scalar density of arbitrary
nonzero weight; the metric and connection have no independent ex-
istence, but are defined in terms of these two irreducible geometric
objects. There is no orthonormal basis of vectors, even with spinor
fields present.
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There are various relationships that might obtain between nearly
empirically equivalent theories. The following list is intended to be
suggestive rather than exhaustive, but the variety of options that have
genuine physical examples is already striking. A modal sort of near
equivalence is this: theory T1 has all the models (or “worlds” for va-
riety) of T2, but T1 has some additional models as well. If expressed
in terms of axioms, T1 is logically weaker than T2. An interesting
example would be to consider GR with the possible further require-
ment of global hyperbolicity [Wald, 1984]. Consider GR without the
requirement of global hyperbolicity as T1 and GR with global hyper-
bolicity as T2. Clearly there is no hope for disproving T1 on empir-
ical grounds if one is doing science in a T2-world. One might also
consider ordinary quantum mechanics as T2 and Bohmian mechan-
ics, which need not enforce the quantum equilibrium condition, as
T1. A third example takes T2 to be Newtonian gravity and T1 to be
Cartan’s variant of it using a space-time with a curved connection
[Misner et al., 1973, Malament, 1995, Norton, 1999, Norton, 2008];
the difference between these theories strikes me as rather more signifi-
cant than it seems to Norton. Clearly much depends on how common
and interesting the models in T1 but not in T2 are. If most interest-
ing T1-worlds are also T2-worlds, then finding oneself in a T2-world
will not even probabilistically confirm T2 much over T1. There might,
however, be a sense in which T1 would be noticeably disconfirmed for
a scientist in a T2 world if T2 worlds are only a small portion of the
worlds of T1. Anthropic considerations might also be relevant if em-
bodied scientists could not exist in some worlds: embodied scientists
will certainly not discover that models incompatible with the exis-
tence of embodied scientists are realized in nature. A second kind
of modal near-equivalence could arise if each theory has some models
not in the other theory, along with some shared models. For exam-
ple, GR with global hyperbolicity and GR with asymptotic flatness
(such as can obtain for localized sources [Wald, 1984]) share some
models, while each theory has models that the other lacks. A third
kind of near-equivalence arises if every model in T2 is diffeomorphic
to part, but perhaps not all, of a model of T1. Some of the most
obvious examples, such as might posit that the world began 5 min-
utes ago [Russell, 1921, Russell, 1948, Ellis, 1985] or even 6000 years
ago [Gosse, 1857, Clendinnen, 1989, Musgrave, 1992, Earman, 1995,
Turner, 2007, Norton, 2008], or that certain objects exist only in-
termittently [Russell, 1948, Dejnozka, 1995], while otherwise agreeing
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with conventional history, might seem contrived. In fact examples of
this phenomenon need not be of the “ad hoc cut-and-paste variety”
[Earman, 1996, p. 630], to use Earman’s phrase. One example is the
spin 2 route to Einstein equations (cited above) with the background
metric taken seriously [Pitts and Schieve, 2004] as T2, while geomet-
rical GR is T1. For example, for the Reissner-Nordstro¨m solution for
charged spherically symmetric masses in the non-extremal (Q2 < M2)
case, it appears to be possible to include the region between the outer
and inner horizons, but impossible to include the region within the
inner horizon, while taking the flat background metric’s null cone se-
riously as a bound for the effective curved metric. Thus the realistic
spin 2 approach to Einstein’s equations has a solution that lacks a
piece present in the geometrical approach—albeit a piece that one is
not likely to miss. A second example takes GR in terms of a metric as
T2 and GR in terms of the Ashtekar variables including a connection
and a densitized spatial triad, which permit a degenerate metric (that
is, with vanishing determinant) [Jacobson and Romano, 1992], as T1.
All of these kinds of empirical near-equivalence have the property that
there is no experiment that can be performed in both theories and such
that the results disagree, but they give different lists of physically pos-
sible worlds. While these sorts of examples merit philosophers’ atten-
tion, I will set them aside to focus on a less recondite phenomenon.
However, the phenomenon in question, taken from particle physics,
requires comparison not of two theories as is customary, but of one
theory and a one-parameter family of rivals.
3 Approximate Empirical Equiva-
lence
There is a kind of empirical near-equivalence that is considerably
weaker in some respects, involving differences in occurrent properties
in similar events in similar models of the compared theories, and yet
implying permanent rather than merely transient underdetermina-
tion. It has seemed at least a priori unlikely to some noted physicists
that satisfactory physical theories would be isolated, rather than
obtainable as limiting cases of a one- (or more) parameter family
of theories characterized, for example, by various particle masses
[von Seeliger, 1895, Neumann, 1896, Bass and Schro¨dinger, 1955,
Boulware and Deser, 1972, Babak and Grishchuk, 2003]. Particle
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masses are related to the range of the relevant potential, where
the range is a distance scale 1
m
over which a potential of the form
1
r
e−mr has the exponential decay factor decay by 1
e
[Jackson, 1975,
p. 598]. (Recall that the ‘speed of light’ c and reduced Planck’s
constant h¯ are set to 1 whenever needed.) For m = 0 the interaction
is said to have long or infinite range, as both electromagnetism
and gravity are typically held to have. Perhaps more to the point
than the question about whether theories should be so isolated is
the question why our theorizing about the physical world, given
our finite empirical knowledge, should single out just one out of
a variety of viable theories with differing particle masses? While
Neumann and Seeliger, writing in the 1890s, certainly did not
have the concept of particle masses in mind—the link between
particle mass and range of the interaction would come later
[de Broglie, 1924, Yukawa, 1935, Kobzarev and Okun, 1968]—the
underdetermination point and (especially with Neumann) the
exponential form that would later be related to particle masses
were already available. Seeliger writes (as translated by Nor-
ton) that Newton’s law was “a purely empirical formula and
assuming its exactness would be a new hypothesis supported by
nothing.” [von Seeliger, 1895, Norton, 1999]. Empirically the
photon mass is constrained to be rather small by ordinary stan-
dards [Goldhaber and Nieto, 1971, Luo et al., 2003, Tu et al., 2005,
Goldhaber and Nieto, 2009], less than 10−50 grams. This bound is
close enough to 0 for most practical purposes. However, this mass,
not being dimensionless, is not close to 0 in a mathematical sense. It
is doubtful that there is a nonarbitrary sense in which one can say
truly that the empirical evidence makes it probable that photon mass
is zero. (A Bayesian effort will be entertained below.) The question
of the photon mass (or the range of the gravitational potential)
counts as a natural example, rather than cultured or artificial (to use
Norton’s classification, based on that for pearls [Norton, 2008]). The
contest, however, is not best framed in terms of a pair of theories,
because of the infinite possibilities for the range of the gravitational
potential or the value of the photon mass.
One can therefore define the relevant concept of approximate em-
pirical equivalence employed here to motivate a novel sort of under-
determination. The key point is that the empirical equivalence is
not merely approximate, and hence perhaps temporary; rather, the
empirical equivalence is arbitrarily close and hence permanent. Let
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{(∀m)Tm} be a collection of theories labeled by a parameter m, where
all positive values of m above 0 are permitted. (One can admit a posi-
tive upper bound for m, but that change makes no difference.) Let T0
be another theory of the same phenomena. If the empirical predictions
of the family {(∀m)Tm} tend to those of T0 in the limit m→ 0, then
the family {(∀m)Tm} empirically approximates T0 arbitrarily closely.
Though T0 is empirically distinguishable in principle from any partic-
ular element of {(∀m)Tm}, yielding merely transient underdetermina-
tion between any two theories, T0 is not empirically distinguishable
from the entire family. At any stage of empirical inquiry, there are fi-
nite uncertainties regarding the empirical phenomena. If T0 presently
fits the data, then so do some members of {(∀m)Tm} for nonzero but
sufficiently small m. While scientific progress can tighten the bounds
onm towards 0, human finitude prevents the bounds from being tight-
ened to the point that all nonzero values of m are excluded while T0
is admitted. Thus for any stage of empirical science, there will be
underdetermination between T0 and elements of {(∀m)Tm} with m
close enough to 0. The underdetermination between T0 and part of
{(∀m)Tm} is in this sense permanent. One can never exclude empiri-
cally all the Tm theories with m > 0.
This sort of approximate empirical equivalence has a major ad-
vantage over exact empirical equivalence, namely, that a foe of un-
derdetermination cannot avoid the rivalry by identifying the rivals as
formulations of the same theory—except perhaps by an extreme veri-
ficationism going beyond the mature form of logical empiricism. The
theory Tm for some specific nonzero m is clearly a distinct theory from
T0, incompatible with T0, making different predictions from T0.
4 Approximate Empirical Equiva-
lence in Scalar Gravity: The Neglected
Rivalry
Before addressing the question of the photon mass, it is helpful to
consider an analogous simpler question regarding the range of gravi-
tation, which arose in the 19th century for Newtonian gravity, should
have arisen for relativistic scalar gravity (but did not in a timely way),
and arose in the late 1930s for theories related to General Relativity.
With the development of Special Relativity it became evident that a
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relativistic theory of gravity was needed. Clearly the instantaneous
action at a distance in Newton’s theory did not agree with Special
Relativity. A local field theory would be ideal. Eventually, with some
help from Einstein, Gunnar Nordstro¨m had a satisfactory scalar the-
ory [Renn and Schemmel, 2007], at least prior to the observed bending
of light. This theory was fully in accord with Special Relativity, in the
sense of being a local field theory with (at least) invariance under the
Poincare´ group of translations and Lorentz boosts and rotations—
though in fact the group is larger, as will appear shortly. Einstein
and Fokker expressed this theory in a more geometrical form, so that
it yielded an effectively curved spacetime that was conformally flat
[Einstein and Fokker, 1914]. In other words, the light cones reflect-
ing the speed of light in Special Relativity was not affected, but the
gravitational potential deformed the volume element of spacetime.
Developments in group theory as applied to relativistic quantum
mechanics from the 1930s, such as by Wigner [Wigner, 1939], clas-
sified fields in terms of representations of the Lorentz group with
various masses and various spins. Relativistic massive scalar fields,
if non-interacting, satisfy the Klein-Gordon equation. Given particle
physicists’ taxonomy in terms of mass and spin, it is natural to look
for and to fill in the blanks by considering all the possibilities. (Apart
from particle physics, it is easy to fail to notice the gap, which is in
fact what generally happened.) Thus when one considers a massless
scalar theory of gravity, such as Nordstro¨m’s, it is natural to consider
a massive variant and to ascertain whether the massless limit of the
massive theory is smooth. If it is, then the massive variant serves as
a rival to the massless theory.
Discussions of Nordstro¨m’s scalar gravity, a serious competitor to
Einstein’s program for some years during the middle 1910s, are said
to have shown that even scalar gravity showed the inability of Special
Relativity (SR) to accommodate gravitation [Misner et al., 1973, p.
179] [Norton, 2007, p. 414]. Nordstro¨m’s theory indeed has a merely
conformally flat space-time geometry [Einstein and Fokker, 1914],
which one can write as
gµν = ηˆµν
√−g 12 , (3)
where ηˆµν (with determinant −1) determines the light cones just
as if for a flat metric in SR. Nordstro¨m’s theory is invariant under
the 15-parameter conformal group rather than just the 10-parameter
Poincare´ group standard in SR, whereas massive variants of Nord-
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stro¨m’s theory are merely Poincare´-invariant and hence special rela-
tivistic in the strict sense. As it happens, massive variants of Nord-
stro¨m’s theory were never proposed in a timely way, and indeed not at
all (to my knowledge) until one version was proposed, unwittingly, in
1968 [Freund and Nambu, 1968, Deser and Halpern, 1970] using uni-
versal coupling to the trace of the total stress-energy tensor. Elsewhere
I have shown that there is, at least, a one-parameter family of such
theories [Pitts, 2009c]. While the kinetic term is just that of Nord-
stro¨m’s theory, the mass terms can be written in terms of an effective
volume element
√−g, which contains the gravitational potential, and
also (in the mass term only) the undistorted volume element
√−η of
the flat metric. For any nonzero real w (including w = 1 by l’Hoˆpital’s
rule), a universally coupled massive variant of Nordstro¨m’s theory is
given by
Lmass = m
2
64piG
[ √−g
w − 1 +
√−gw√−η1−w
w(1− w) −
√−η
w
]
. (4)
(The case w = 0, at least in the extant derivation, is inadmissible
because the field redefinition used in the derivation fails to exist.)
One can express this mass term as a quadratic term in the potential
(naturally) and, typically, a series of higher powers using the expansion√−gw = √−ηw + 8w
√
piGγ˜, where γ˜ is the gravitational potential.
The result is
Lmass = −m2
[
γ˜2
2
√−η2w−1 +
(1− 2w)4
√
piGγ˜3
3
√−η3w−1 + . . .
]
. (5)
This one-parameter family of theories closely resembles
the 2-parameter family Ogievetsky-Polubarinov family of
massive tensor theories [Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965,
Ogievetskii and Polubarinov, 1966], which can also be derived
in a similar fashion [Pitts and Schieve, 2007]. The case w = 1
2
, which
conveniently terminates at quadratic order, is the Freund-Nambu
theory [Freund and Nambu, 1968].
The concepts needed for massive scalar gravity were already avail-
able in the 1910s. That is due especially to Neumann and Seeliger’s
modification of Newtonian gravity in the 1890s with an exponentially
decaying potential [Pockels, 1891, Neumann, 1896, von Seeliger, 1896,
Pauli, 1921, North, 1965, Norton, 1999]. To find a massive relativis-
tic scalar gravity theory, one only needed to do to Nordstro¨m’s
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theory what they had done to Newton’s. The mathematics was
available in the 1910s or 1920s as well [Cotton, 1898, Cotton, 1899,
Poincare´, 1902, Finzi, 1903, Fubini, 1905, Weyl, 1918, Finzi, 1922,
Finzi, 1923, Schouten and Struik, 1919, Schouten, 1921, Struik, 1922,
Schouten, 1924, Levi-Civita, 1926, Schouten and Struik, 1938]: one
needs two metrics, one of which is flat, the other being conformally re-
lated to it. It is simply an accident of history that relativistic massive
Nordstro¨m scalar gravity was not proposed in the 1910s.
Had it been proposed, the history of 20th century space-time the-
ory would have been different in noteworthy ways, because moves
that seemed plausible or inevitable would have been recognized as
merely optional or plausible, respectively. The infinite range/massless
cases of Newton and Nordstro¨m are geometrizable. The equations
for Newton’s theory can be recast (perhaps with change of content)
in terms of a curious but sophisticated geometrical form with the
gravitational field absorbed into the connection [Misner et al., 1973,
Earman and Friedman, 1973]. The geometrizability of Nordstro¨m’s
theory in terms of conformally flat Riemannian geometries was noted
above [Einstein and Fokker, 1914]. In both cases one learns some-
thing important about arguably surplus structure in the theory. One
should not immediately conclude that one has also learned some-
thing about the world, about gravitation itself, however. By con-
trast with the massless (infinite range) cases, massive (finite range)
scalar gravities are not geometrizable. For Neumann-Seeliger non-
relativistic gravity, the gravitational potential cannot be fully ab-
sorbed into the connection. The rather large symmetry group of New-
tonian gravity [Misner et al., 1973] is thus reduced to the Galilean
group. The relativistic massive scalar theories involves both the con-
formally flat metric gµν = ηˆµν
√−g 12 of Nordstro¨m’s theory (as ge-
ometrized by Einstein and Fokker [Einstein and Fokker, 1914]) and
the flat metric ηµν = ηˆµν
√−η 12 of SR, as is obvious from the
mass terms above (and the suppressed kinetic term). The symme-
try group is thus reduced from the conformal group to the Poincare´
group. The two metrics’ conformal parts determining the null cones
are of course identical. Because there are two metrics present, one
has a good argument for the conventionality of geometry, of a sort
entertained in advance by Poincare´ [Poincare´, 1913, pp. 88, 89]
[Menahem, 2001, Freund et al., 1969], as opposed to Eddington’s em-
piricism [Eddington, 1920, Eddington, 1928]: there just is not any spe-
cific fact of the matter about what metrical geometry is yielded by
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experiments that are sensitive to the gravitational mass term. (The
modal scope of Poincare´’s argument is broader than just one’s fa-
vorite theory, such as GTR, to which Eddington appealed. One does
not want a philosophy of geometry to impart a spurious necessity to
contingent facts about our best current theory [Norton, 1993, pp. 848,
849].) For the same reasons, strong versions of the equivalence prin-
ciple are not admissible: manifestly inertia and gravitation are not
the same phenomenon, because inertia is represented by the back-
ground structures, whereas gravity is unambiguously represented by
the gravitational potential. It is noteworthy, then, how excessive at-
tention to the equivalence principle and geometrization tend to render
empirical rivals to theories described by Newton’s or Einstein’s theo-
ries inconceivable: having insisted on a sparse geometrical ontology in
formulating these theories, one lacks the resources to construct rival
theories. It is then all too easy to regard the theories in question as in-
evitable, the wave of the future, an assured result of modern progress,
or the like. But it is only the empirical fact of the bending of light by
gravity, not any inherent conceptual defect, that made it impossible
to treat gravity adequately as a special relativistic theory of a mas-
sive scalar field. Relativistic gravitation as such does not burst the
bounds of Special Relativity by having a larger symmetry group, pace
([Misner et al., 1973, p. 179] [Norton, 2007, p. 414]). While the mass
term (and hence the missing part of the structure of Minkowski space-
time) is not demonstrably necessary, it is certainly permitted. Had
Nordstro¨m’s theory still been viable by the time that Wigner’s classifi-
cation of Lorentz group representations in terms of mass and spin was
widely known, it seems certain that massive scalar gravity would have
been considered. Its neglect until 1968 [Freund and Nambu, 1968], if
not the present, is one of the many disadvantages from the well known
[Rovelli, 2002] gulf between general relativists and particle physicists.
(Helping to overcome this neglect is one reason for attending to the
particle physics view of Einstein’s equations above.) The precedent
that should have been noticed for massive scalar gravity suggests by
analogy that one could consider massive tensor gravity as well.
In the actual contingent history (as opposed to a rationally recon-
structed one [Lakatos, 1970, Lakatos, 1971]), Einstein was unaware of
Seeliger’s work until after the final GR field equations were known
[Einstein, 1996, p. 420] [Einstein, 1998, p. 557] [Einstein, 2002a,
pp. 142, 146] [Einstein, 2002b, p. 189]. When he did discuss the
idea in 1917 (not yet aware of Seeliger’s work) [Einstein, 1923], he
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drew an analogy between massive scalar gravity and his cosmological
constant term, but a spurious one [Trautman, 1965, DeWitt, 1965,
Freund et al., 1969, Treder, 1968, Schucking, 1991, Norton, 1999,
Harvey and Schucking, 2000, Faraoni and Cooperstock, 1998]—an er-
ror that many would repeat in future years, spawning repeated cor-
rections. The cosmological constant introduces a zeroth order term,
not just a first order term, into the field equations. (This mis-
take may have been diagnosed first by Otto Heckmann in 1942
[Heckmann, 1968, Harvey and Schucking, 2000], but with little effect.)
This false analogy tends to hide from view the possibility of a genuine
analog to massive scalar gravity, that is, massive tensor gravity, or
massive GR more specifically. Massive GR will reappear below.
Massive scalar gravity is an unusual but interesting instance of
an interacting massive scalar theory. Massive scalar (spin 0) theo-
ries have a smooth massless limit, not only classically, but also under
quantization [Weinberg, 1995, p. 246].
5 Massive Spinor Fields: The Neu-
trino Case
Massive spinor (spin 1
2
) theories also have a smooth massless limit
[Weinberg, 1995, Deser, 1980]. Thus it was relatively straightforward
to give up the traditional default assumption of vanishing neutrino
mass in favor of nonzero masses when doing so helped to resolve other
neutrino-related puzzles [Roy, 2000]. The fact that neutrinos are now
believed to be massive, after having been assumed massless, makes
the relevance of empirically permitted mass terms the more evident.
6 Approximate Empirical Equiva-
lence in Electromagnetism
6.1 Proca Massive vs. Maxwell Massless Pho-
tons
It is not immediately obvious that the massless limit is smooth
for vector (spin 1) fields, such as electromagnetism, but ultimately
the limit is in fact smooth. This question of the photon mass
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can be considered at both the classical and quantum levels, giving
philosophically interesting test cases for approximate empirical
equivalence. While the usual Maxwell electromagnetism has a
massless photon (if one may follow the common practice of borrowing
quantum terminology for classical contexts), it is fairly well known
that the massive Proca variants exist and approximate the massless
theory arbitrarily well for sufficiently small photon mass in both
the classical [Jackson, 1975, Sundermeyer, 1982] and quantum con-
texts [Belinfante, 1949, Glauber, 1953, Bass and Schro¨dinger, 1955,
Stueckelberg, 1957, Boulware and Gilbert, 1962, Boulware, 1970,
Goldhaber and Nieto, 1971, Slavnov and Faddeev, 1971,
Boulware and Deser, 1972, Slavnov, 1972, Shizuya, 1975,
Ruegg and Ruiz-Altaba, 2004, Goldhaber and Nieto, 2009]. In ther-
mal contexts, where one might expect the third degree of freedom to be
relevant, it decouples in the massless limit, so that it takes forever to
reach equilibrium; hence equilibrium thermodynamic quantities based
on three field degrees of freedom are physically irrelevant and unob-
servable [Bass and Schro¨dinger, 1955, Goldhaber and Nieto, 1971].
Because Maxwell’s electromagnetism is empirically distinguishable
from any particular Proca theory (that is, with some given photon
mass), and the various Proca theories with different photon masses
are also empirically inequivalent, there is no possibility of trivializing
the rivalry by regarding the supposed rivals as merely the same
theory in different guises. However, for any set of observations with
finite precision—which is the only kind that human finitude permits
at a given stage of inquiry—there exists a range of sufficiently small
photon masses such that the massive electromagnetic theories are
empirically indistinguishable from the massless theory. Furthermore,
the difference between the massless theory and the massive theories is
quite deep conceptually, because only the massless theory has gauge
freedom and thus has field equations that mathematically underde-
termine the fields’ time evolution (assuming that the potential Aµ is
used rather than the field strength Fµν), along the lines of the hole
argument in GR. (In comparison to GR [Earman and Norton, 1987],
the analog of the hole argument for electromagnetism is not a very
difficult problem, because space-time point individuation is not at
issue due to the purely internal nature of the gauge transformations
(lacking derivatives of the fields) and consequent ease of finding the
gauge-invariant observable field strength Fµν .) By the same token,
the massive Proca theories merely permit charge conservation (which
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typically holds as a consequence of the field equations for the charged
sources), whereas Maxwell’s theory enforces charge conservation
and so can be coupled only to conserved sources. Thus the contest
between Maxwell’s massless electromagnetism and Proca’s massive
electromagnetisms provides a paradigm case of approximate empirical
equivalence: a contest between (or should one say, among) genuine
rivals, which cannot be wholly resolved empirically, and on which
matters of considerable interest turn.
The most compact and perspicuous way to begin a technical dis-
cussion of a classical field theory is to exhibit its Lagrangian density, a
function of some fields and their derivatives, such that the space-time
integral of the Lagrangian density L, the “action” S of the theory,
satisfies the principle of least (or perhaps merely stationary) action.
In simple mechanical cases, the Lagrangian is the kinetic energy less
the potential energy. The source-free Maxwell field equations (in man-
ifestly Lorentz-covariant form and without sources) follow from a La-
grangian density of the form
L = −1
4
FµνF
µν , (6)
where the indices are moved using the Lorentz metric diag(−1, 1, 1, 1),
Fµν =def ∂µAν − ∂νAµ is the electromagnetic field strength, ∂ takes
the four-dimensional gradient, and repeated indices are summed from
0 (time) to 3. For Maxwell’s theory, the vector potential Aµ admits
the gauge transformation
Aµ → Aµ + ∂µφ
for an arbitrary function φ; this transformation makes no observable
difference. This Lagrangian density is manifestly gauge invariant, be-
cause it is built from the gauge-invariant field strength only. For the
massive Proca electromagnetisms, the Lagrangian density is
Lp = −1
4
FµνF
µν − m
2
2
AµA
µ. (7)
Evidently the A2 term breaks the gauge symmetry in the massive case.
The resulting Euler-Lagrange field equations are
∂L
∂Aµ
− ∂ν ∂L
∂(∂νAµ)
= ∂νF
νµ −m2Aµ = 0. (8)
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Whereas Maxwell’s theory has 2 degrees of freedom at each spatial
point (written as 2∞3 degrees of freedom), Proca’s theories have 3∞3
degrees of freedom.3 The extra degree of freedom (at each point),
however, is weakly coupled for small photon masses and so is not
readily noticed experimentally. The treatment of the two theories
(or theory types) using the Dirac-Bergmann constrained dynamics
formalism is straightforward [Sundermeyer, 1982]. The approximate
empirical equivalence between Maxwell’s theory and Proca’s theo-
ries for small enough photon masses is preserved under quantization:
massive quantum electrodynamics (QED) approximates the standard
massless QED arbitrarily well, as noted above. It follows that in a
world with electromagnetism as the only force, it would be impos-
sible for finite beings to rule out all of the massive electromagnetic
theories empirically, and thus impossible to determine empirically
whether gauge freedom was a fundamental feature of the electromag-
netic laws. Here I am forgetting about the Stueckelberg formulation
[Ruegg and Ruiz-Altaba, 2004, Pitts, 2009a], which shows that gauge
freedom per se is not even distinctive of massless electromagnetism:
one can have gauge freedom and a photon mass term, unless one bans
certain extra gauge compensation fields. The Stueckelberg mass term
takes the form −m2
2
(Aµ−∂µψ)(Aµ−∂µψ). A gauge transformation of
Aµ is compensated by changing ψ: Aµ → Aµ + ∂µχ, ψ → ψ + χ. The
Stueckelberg formulation raises a new set of questions involving ex-
actly rather than approximately empirically equivalent theories, and
so will not be discussed here.
A relevant distinction between massive classical electromagnetism
and massive quantum electrodynamics pertains to the tendency of
classically fixed parameters to acquire quantum corrections. Classi-
cally one might take the photon mass to be an arbitrary parameter,
handed down from above and not susceptible to explanation, but only
to empirical determination. However, in quantum field theory, a small
nonzero bare photon mass might acquire large corrections, whereas a
vanishing photon mass is forced to stay vanishing by gauge invariance.
Thus in massive quantum electrodynamics, the smallness of the pho-
ton mass seems to call for explanation, but no explanation (other than
3The reader will observe the importance of distinguishing 2∞3 from 3∞3, notwith-
standing rules for Cantorian transfinite arithmetic [Moore, 1990]. The lesson seems to be
that physical theories involve continuity properties of sets from which cardinality abstracts.
Evidently cardinality does not exhaust the useful notions of “same size” or counting for
infinite collections.
23
fine tuning) is available.
6.2 Bayesian Treatment of the Photon Mass
One might consider whether Bayesian confirmation theory has the
resources to say something useful about the problem at hand. For
example, can one show that the probability that there is a true Proca
theory goes to zero as the upper bound on the photon mass goes to
zero?4 Answering this question requires some discussion of plausible
prior probabilities for various values of the photon mass. The mass-
less photon case is special, special enough that it deserves a finite
probability all by itself. Presumably no nonzero value of the photon
mass is special, except for those comparable to the upper bound on
the photon mass at a given stage of empirical progress. Thus there
is a mixture of discrete and continuous values. One can handle the
massless case by including a Dirac delta function term bδ(m) in the
probability density, where b is some positive number less than 2; one
recalls that integrating the right half of δ(m) gives 1
2
rather than 1. It
is somewhat less clear what form the distribution should take for finite
values of the photon massm (apart from being effectively 0 much past
the experimental bounds). When somewhat similar problems in par-
ticle physics (but without bδ(m) at 0) have been treated by Bayesian
means—which seems to be rather rare—it has been proposed that the
probability density function does not matter terribly much, as long as
one avoids cases that strongly favor values near 0 [D’Agostini, 1995,
pp. 54-56]. Thus a uniform distribution over some finite interval of
mass, a triangular distribution bounded above by a downward-sloped
straight line, and a half-Gaussian peaked at 0 gave comparable re-
sults. A distribution sharply favoring values near zero, on the other
hand, was judged to give “ridiculous” results [D’Agostini, 1995, p.
56]. (Note that this is not the value 0 itself, which I give a Dirac δ
spike.) For the photon mass case, it is visually obvious what happens,
at least for distributions not strongly favoring values near 0 (leaving
aside the bδ(m) term). New experiments tighten the bounds on the
photon mass, chopping off the right end (larger m) of the probability
distribution and scaling up the remainder. The δ(m) term gets scaled
up but never chopped. Thus sufficiently vigorous Bayesian updating
will concentrate arbitrarily much of the probability in the δ(m) term
4I thank a referee for asking this question.
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representing the massless case, leaving the probability that one or an-
other Proca theory is true to approach 0 as the photon mass’s upper
bound goes to 0. If, on the other hand, one chooses a prior probability
distribution for the photon mass which does favor small nonzero values
heavily, then Bayesian updating will be all the less effective in under-
mining commitment to massive photons. Insofar as one can justify
not favoring small nonzero photon masses in the prior probability—a
question perhaps worthy of more attention—it follows that a series of
experiments driving the photon mass bound toward 0 would likewise
drive the probability that a Proca theory is true to 0.
Whether this result is very significant in practice is open to ques-
tion, however. It provides a diachronic rationality constraint on de-
grees of belief in the Proca family for a Bayesian agent who lives long
enough to see arbitrarily strict bounds placed on the photon mass.
But human finitude and perhaps other factors might well ensure that
we cannot, even over generations of scientists, drive the bound below
some certain finite value. Thus the arbitrariness in the prior probabil-
ity might well fail to wash out. One reason might be the energy-time
uncertainty relation in conjunction with the age of the universe, from
which some estimate a lower measurability bound of roughly 10−66g
[Tu et al., 2005]. It is not clear whether one’s degree of belief to-
day that there is a true Proca theory ought to be on the order of
.55 or 10−5. With the serious possibility that progress in tightening
the bounds on the photon mass must cease eventually, qualitatively
the same situation (with more reluctance to accept values near .55,
assuming that a nonzero mass is not detected) might plausibly still
exist in 500 years. It appears that Bayesianism’s ability to formulate
interesting questions here perhaps outstrips human ability to answer
them.
6.3 Possible Inductive Lessons about Under-
determination in Particle Physics
Whereas the massive scalar and massive spinor cases gave no problems
in taking the massless limit, care was needed to achieve the same
result for the vector case instantiated by Proca’s electromagnetism. A
smooth massless limit does obtain, however. Having pondered these
cases for spin 0, spin 1
2
, and spin 1,, one might be tempted by induction
to draw some philosophical morals, especially if one is unmoved with
surprise by the smallness of the photon mass in massive quantum
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electrodynamics. Three seemingly plausible morals are:
1. generically there are rival theories that will remain empirically
indistinguishable no matter how far empirical inquiry advances,
despite the fact that the rival theories give contradictory answers
for the same experiment, because theories with slightly different
particle masses (or perhaps other parameters) are available.
2. theories that are nearly empirically equivalent classically remain
so under quantization, so empirical equivalence is stable under
the change of auxiliary hypotheses from classical to quantum.
3. drawing theoretical conclusions to the effect that gauge free-
dom (and hence mathematical indeterminism) is present in the
physics of the real world is inadvisable, because contemporary
physical theories offer a choice between Maxwell’s electromag-
netism, a gauge theory with indeterministic equations for Aµ,
and Proca’s theories with deterministic equations and no gauge
freedom.
Doubtless it is inadvisable in general to invest heavily in metaphysical
results that are fragile under small changes in physical theory. One
should pause to feel the force of these lessons and develop appropriate
expectations for their fulfillment in more advanced contexts. (This
corresponds roughly to learning some of the lessons of particle physics
into the early 1960s.)
7 No Approximate Equivalence in
Yang-Mills Theories?
In the early days of Gauge Theory, it was thought that lo-
cal gauge-invariance could be an ‘approximate’ symmetry.
Perhaps one could add mass terms for the vector field that
violate local symmetry, but make the model look more like
the observed situation in particle physics. We now know,
however. . . . [’t Hooft, 2007, p. 688]
It turns out that all three of the above lessons might well be hasty,
because matters are much more complicated for both Yang-Mills fields
(used for the theories of the weak and strong nuclear forces) and
gravity. In both cases most of the relevant results appeared in the
early 1970s, though they have generally escaped discussion among
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philosophers. Among other reasons that the three lessons are per-
haps too hasty, it turns out that quantization can be dangerous to
the health of massive theories. The preservation of approximate em-
pirical equivalence between the massive and massless cases of elec-
tromagnetism under quantization is something of an accident due to
the theories’ simplicity, as appears in consideration of the Yang-Mills
and gravitational cases from work in the early 1970s. In particular,
quantized massive Yang-Mills theory differs from the massless the-
ory even in the limit of vanishing mass [Slavnov and Faddeev, 1971,
Slavnov, 1972]; the m → 0 limit disagrees with the m = 0 the-
ory by a finite amount in certain observable predictions. Moreover,
quantized massive Yang-Mills theory is either non-unitary or not
power-counting renormalizable [Wong, 1971, Delbourgo et al., 1988,
Ruegg and Ruiz-Altaba, 2004, ’t Hooft, 2007]. The massive Yang-
Mills theories envisioned are those with a traditional mass term of
the form
− m
2
2
AiµA
iµ,
which breaks the gauge symmetry in an explicit fash-
ion, This is not the now-standard Higgs mechanism
[Kaku, 1993, Peskin and Schroeder, 1995, Weinberg, 1996,
Smeenk, 2006, Lyre, 2008] for giving an effective mass and fi-
nite range to the weak nuclear force by spontaneous symmetry
breaking, by which an interaction between the Yang-Mills vector
bosons and the Higgs scalars, after a field redefinition to measure
the scalars with respect to a true energy minimum and another
field redefinition (in the form of a rotation in abstract space of the
vector potentials by the weak mixing angle) yields an effective mass
term for the Yang-Mills bosons. Non-unitarity is disastrous because
negative probabilities seem unintelligible. The lack of power-counting
renormalizability seems less disastrous to some authors nowadays
[Weinberg, 1995] than it once did: one settles for an effective rather
than fundamental theory and thus admits that the theory at hand
works only up to some definite energy range, after which further
terms would be required. Under quantization, the massive Proca
electromagnetic theories escape this painful dilemma merely because
their mathematical simplicity as Abelian gauge theories (that is,
with a gauge group in which the order of two transformations makes
no difference to the result), apart from the mass term that breaks
the gauge symmetry, excludes a troublesome term that appears in
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the non-Abelian Yang-Mills case [Ruegg and Ruiz-Altaba, 2004].
Electromagnetism is thus too simple a theory to exhibit the dangers
that quantization poses to the health of field theories; its atypi-
cal simplicity renders it an insufficiently demanding test-bed for
philosophical morals of the sort suggested above. This phenomenon
involving Yang-Mills theories exemplifies or resembles Laudan and
Leplin’s notion of instability of empirical equivalence under change
of auxiliary hypotheses [Laudan and Leplin, 1991, Leplin, 1997].
Yang-Mills and massive Yang-Mills field theories are approximately
empirically equivalent classically, but this equivalence appears to be
violated at the quantum level. If there is an essence of Yang-Mills
theories that can be exemplified in either classical or quantum form,
then one can take this example as a literal instance rather than mere
analogy to Laudan and Leplin’s phenomenon, which is cast in terms
of logically conjoined theories and hypotheses.
8 Approximate Equivalence in Elec-
troweak Theory: Yang-Mills Theory
with Essentially Abelian Sector
The underdetermination between the quantized Maxwell theory
and the lower-mass quantized Proca theories is permanent. It
does not immediately follow that our best science leaves the
photon mass unspecified apart from empirical bounds, however.
Electromagnetism can be unified with an SU(2) Yang-Mills field
describing the weak nuclear force into the electroweak theory (see,
for example, [Weinberg, 1996]). The resulting electroweak unification
of course is not simply a logical conjunction of the electromag-
netic and weak theories; the theories undergoing unification are
modified in the process (c.f. [Kukla, 1998], chapter 4). Maxwell’s
theory can participate in this unification; can Proca theories
participate while preserving renormalizability and unitarity? Prob-
ably they can [Cornwall et al., 1974a, Cornwall et al., 1974b,
Calogeracos et al., 1981, Barrow and Burman, 1984,
Ignatiev and Joshi, 1996, Ruegg and Ruiz-Altaba, 2004], though
a complete demonstration seems still to be lacking. Thus evidently
the underdetermination between Maxwell and Proca persists even in
electroweak theory. There is some non-uniqueness in the photon mass
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term, partly due to the rotation by the weak mixing angle between
the original fields in the SU(2)×U(1) group and the mass eigenstates
after spontaneous symmetry breaking. Thus the physical photon
is not simply the field corresponding to the original U(1) group,
contrary to naive expectations. There are also various empirically
negligible but perhaps conceptually important effects that can arise
in such theories. Among these are charge dequantization—the
charges of charged particles are no longer integral multiples of a
smallest charge—and perhaps charge non-conservation. Crucial to
the possibility of including a Proca-type mass term (as opposed
to merely getting mass by spontaneous symmetry breaking) is the
non-semi-simple nature of the gauge group SU(2) × U(1): this
group has a subgroup U(1) that is Abelian and that commutes with
the whole of the larger group. Were the electroweak theory to be
embedded in some larger semi-simple group such as SU(5), then no
Proca mass term could be included [Calogeracos et al., 1981]. The
dependence of this outcome and others recently discussed on involved
physical calculations shows that these are not examples of theories for
which empirical equivalence can be demonstrated by a brief argument
in a philosophy of science paper—examples which have been a target
of Norton’s critique [Norton, 2008].
9 Is There Approximate Equivalence
for Gravity? General Relativity and Its
Massive Variants
If Yang-Mills theories qualify the three supposed lessons mentioned
above, so that they fail for mass terms for non-Abelian Yang-Mills
theories but perhaps do hold for the Abelian sector of non-semi-simple
Yang-Mills theories such as the electroweak theory, the still greater
complication of GR renders the three lessons even more contingent
upon detailed physical calculation. After a lull from the mid-70s, there
has been since the mid-90s a large and growing literature on massive
gravities [Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965, Freund et al., 1969,
Boulware and Deser, 1972, Vainshtein, 1972, Visser, 1998,
Karch et al., 2001, Deffayet et al., 2002, Babak and Grishchuk, 2003,
Pitts and Schieve, 2007, Zinoviev, 2007], much of it addressing
whether they approach (local) empirical equivalence with Einstein’s
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equations in the massless limit and are theoretically healthy, even at
the classical level. A widely held view since the early 1970s poses
a dilemma [Boulware and Deser, 1972, Tyutin and Fradkin, 1972]
asserting that massive gravities either have 5∞3 degrees of free-
dom (spin 2) and do not agree with Einstein’s equations in the
massless limit due to the van Dam-Veltman-Zakharov disconti-
nuity [van Dam and Veltman, 1970, van Dam and Veltman, 1972,
Zakharov, 1970], or they have 6∞3 degrees of freedom (spin 2 and
spin 0) and agree empirically with Einstein’s theory in the massless
limit (at least classically), but are theoretically unhealthy and
physically unstable because the spin 0 field has negative kinetic
energy.
Whereas the Proca theory is the unique local lin-
ear massive variant of Maxwell’s electromagnetism, the
most famous massive gravity with 6∞3 degrees of free-
dom, the Freund-Maheshwari-Schonberg massive gravity
[Freund et al., 1969, Boulware and Deser, 1972, Logunov, 1998],
is just one member (albeit the best in some respects)
of a 2-parameter family of massive theories of gravity
[Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965], all of which satisfy univer-
sal coupling [Pitts and Schieve, 2007]. Adding a mass term involves
adding a term quadratic in the potential; higher-order (cubic, quartic,
etc.) self-interaction terms might also be present. The nonlinearity of
the Einstein tensor implies, in contrast to the electromagnetic case,
that there is no obviously best choice for defining the gravitational
potential. While any such definition requires a background metric
ηµν in order that the potential vanish when gravity is turned off
(typically flat space-time), thus making massive theories bimetric,
one can still choose among gµν − ηµν ,
√−ggµν − √−ηηµν (the
best choice for some purposes), gµν − ηµν, and so on, as well as
various nonlinear choices such as gµαη
αβgβν − ηµν and the like
[Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965, Boulware and Deser, 1975]. In
some cases the availability of nonlinear field redefinitions might
make some expressions that look like mass term + interaction
term with one definition of the gravitational potential, appear as a
pure quadratic mass term with another definition; nonetheless the
Einstein tensor remains nonlinear, no matter what definition of the
potential is used. By contrast, the linearity of the Maxwell field
strength tensor makes it natural to have a mass term that is also
linear in Aµ in the field equations (and hence quadratic in Aµ in the
30
Lagrangian density). While one can explore introducing nonlinear
algebraic terms in Aµ describing self-interactions in electromag-
netism, such terms induce acausal propagation if not chosen carefully
[Shamaly and Capri, 1974].
Whether massive gravities are viable even at the classical level
remains a matter of debate in the physics literature. The majority
view is that they are not, but this view has lost the near-consensus
status that it once had. Evidently intuitive expectations about the
ease of constructing approximately empirically equivalent theories to
GR are threatened by devils in the details.
One possibility worthy of exploration is whether the methods
of PT-symmetric quantization can help. PT-symmetric quantiza-
tion has exorcised the vicious ghosts thought to inhabit some the-
ories according to more traditional analyses [Mostafazadeh, 2005,
Bender, 2007, Bender and Mannheim, 2008], though the resulting
theories sometimes have surprising phenomenology. Might PT-
symmetric be helpful for massive gravity or for a prima facie non-
unitary [Delbourgo et al., 1988] massive Yang-Mills theory?
It is also noteworthy that there are examples from fluid mechanics
of theories with negative energy modes that do not yield instabil-
ity in an unphysical fashion; such theories have Hamiltonians that
are not of the typical separable form of a kinetic energy built from
momenta plus a potential energy built from generalized coordinates
[Morrison, 1998]. Massive versions of GR have nonseparable Hamil-
tonians. Thus it seems a bit quick to reject massive gravities simply
because of a wrong-sign degree of freedom, without more detailed anal-
ysis [Pitts and Schieve, 2007]. The majority view’s reliance on first-
order perturbative arguments regarding a theory where nonlinearity
in the Hamiltonian constraint should be important, also might give
one pause. The question seems to be not quite settled, therefore. The
role of such theories in assessing underdetermination is a worthwhile
motive for pursuit, even if the odds are somewhat long. Indeed, com-
paring the literature on massive gravity to works in plasma physics,
where negative energy degrees of freedom are routinely encountered,
one notices among plasma physicists much less tendency to reject such
theories without detailed investigation. Plasma physicists do not con-
clude, much less assume, that negative energy degrees of freedom are
always automatically disastrous; the demonstrable physical relevance
of such theories in plasma physics does not permit rejecting such theo-
ries automatically. Instead plasma physicists have developed criteria,
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including looking for resonances and taking into account the magni-
tudes and signs of the modes in question, that indicate instability
[Weiland and Wilhelmsson, 1977].
Massive gravities, being bimetric, are also susceptible to causal-
ity problems if the relationship between the two metrics’ null cones
is not correct; sometimes it is not, at least not without help
[Pitts and Schieve, 2007]. Though matter sees only the effective
curved metric and gravity only barely sees the flat background met-
ric due to the smallness of the graviton mass, these theories are
only Lorentz-covariant (or covariant under the 15-parameter confor-
mal group in the case of massless spin 0). Thus the usual special
relativistic arguments about superluminality in one frame implying
backwards causation in another frame are applicable. At the quan-
tum level it would be awkward at best to impose Lorentz-covariant
equal-time commutation relations when there is no reason to ex-
pect events that are space-like separated (with respect to the back-
ground metric) to be causally independent. Such causality prob-
lems bear some resemblance to those encountered in the 1960s with
spin 3
2
fields [Velo and Zwanziger, 1969, Velo and Zwanzinger, 1969].
Adding gauge freedom and then judiciously restricting it seems likely
to cure the problem of acausality [Pitts and Schieve, 2007]. Massive
variants of GR are of special interest as foils for GR concerning general
covariance [Pitts, 2009a].
While the above discussions have aimed to survey longstanding is-
sues in particle physics, there are various recent developments also of
interest. In recent years it has been found that if one is willing to in-
troduce a cosmological constant term, in effect using a background
space-time of constant curvature, then there are opportunities for
a smooth massless limit for massive gravitation [Kogan et al., 2001,
Porrati, 2001]. Supergravity theories involve the existence of at least
one field of spin 3
2
. There is also a discontinuity in the massless limit for
spin 3
2
vector-spinors [Deser et al., 1977]; more recently it was found
that a background of constant curvature can make the massless limit
smooth [Deser and Waldron, 2001]. One might take the view that
such alternatives, by leaving the world of fields in flat space-time, are
less simple, and hence perhaps less probable or otherwise less wor-
thy of attention than a case of underdetermination in flat space-time
would be. On the other hand there are recent surprising indications
that highly symmetric (N = 8) supergravity in four space-time dimen-
sions is ultraviolet-finite (better than renormalizable) at least to the
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fourth loop order [Bern et al., 2007, Bern et al., 2009, Kallosh, 2009]
and perhaps to all orders, so spin 3
2
fields seem more likely to ex-
ist in reality than they did previously. (This sort of work is a re-
minder that real scientific progress can be made in contexts that
would not be a challenge for an ideal Bayesian agent, who is logi-
cally and mathematically omniscient.) At any rate there is a lively
current literature on subtle moves that do or might yield a smooth
massless limit even for some spins higher than 1, but a brief sum-
mary would be both difficult and premature. Discontinuity was found
some time ago for higher spin fields as well, such as spin 5
2
and spin
3 [Berends et al., 1979, Berends and van Reisen, 1980], in case such
fields really exist. String theory, at least, has a rich store of higher-
spin fields. Rather than aim for exhaustive discussion, this paper aims
mainly to call attention to longstanding features of particle physics
that are relevant to underdetermination, while pointing the way to-
ward a more active philosophical engagement with such literature in
the future.
10 Conclusion
The provisional character of some conclusions involving more compli-
cated field theories indicates that in these cases, whatever the ultimate
outcomes, the physical details sometimes have important philosophical
consequences. These examples therefore do not provide strong sup-
port for claims that underdetermination is generic throughout science.
They do, however, provide support for the claim that there might
well be interesting cases of permanent underdetermination, even in
our contemporary best science, such as the electroweak quantum field
theory, as well as in simpler theories. The simpler the field theory, the
easier it is to have underdetermination. Higher-spin fields are more
likely to involve either dangerous wrong-sign degrees of freedom or a
discontinuous massless limit.
Consideration of a variety of theories (and formulations thereof)
of contemporary physical relevance has yielded a variety of insights
pertaining to the general philosophy of science. The question of em-
pirical equivalence and underdetermination of theories by data proves
to have highly nontrivial examples, as well as surprising failures, when
one looks into classical and quantum field theory. Thus philosophers
need not rely on thin contrived examples. Particle physics is important
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for general philosophers of science, as well as space-time theorists; it
is not just for philosophers of quantum mechanics. One can add these
reasons to Redhead’s list of reasons for philosophers to study quantum
field theory [Redhead, 1980]. Comparing some contemporary physical
theories also suggests apparently novel sorts of underdetermination.
There is a surprising degree of dependence on the physical details, in-
cluding difficult calculations in quantum field theory, for approximate
underdetermination. Underdetermination can be broken in surprising
ways when auxiliary hypotheses are changed, much as Laudan and
Leplin have anticipated. The kinds of underdetermination discussed
here are immune to trivialization as just linguistic variants of the same
theory. Underdetermination might not be ubiquitous in contemporary
particle physics, but there are enough interesting examples and types
of it that the subject remains of considerable interest.
There are plausible versions of scientific realism that are not threat-
ened by the examples from particle physics discussed here. For exam-
ple, Ernan McMullin writes that
[t]he basic claim made by scientific realism . . . is that the
long-term success of a scientific theory gives reason to be-
lieve that sometime like the entities and structure postu-
lated by the theory actually exists. There are four impor-
tant qualifications built into this: (1) the theory must be
successful over a significant period of time; (2) the explana-
tory success of the theory gives some reason, though not
a conclusive warrant, to believe it; (3) what is believed is
that the theoretical structures are something like the struc-
ture of the real world; (4) no claim is made for a special,
more basic, privileged form of existence for the postulated
entities. [endnote suppressed] These qualifications: “sig-
nificant period,” “some reason,” “something like,” sound
very vague, of course, and vagueness is a challenge to the
philosopher. Can they not be made more precise? I am
not sure that they can; efforts to strengthen the thesis of
scientific realism have . . . left it open to easy refutation.
[McMullin, 1984]
On the other hand, one can imagine more ambitious sorts of scien-
tific realism, to the effect that rival theories will always be in principle
empirically discriminable, and will be discriminated in the not-too-
distant future, that are threatened. A determined scientific realist
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of such an ambitious type could respond to the cases from particle
physics by noting that sometimes evidence has broken the underde-
termination, as in the neutrino and Yang-Mills cases and arguably
the gravitational case, and that these cases give some comfort to the
expectation that either further facts or the instability of empirical
equivalence under change of auxiliaries will always ensure that empir-
ically distinguishable predictions be made. While such a response is
possible, it appears to amount to an expectation of routinely being
mildly lucky. In some cases the underdetermination has indeed been
resolved, but it is not at all clear what motivates the determined sci-
entific realist’s hope that it will always be resolvable, or resolvable on
a time scale that makes us reasonably close to learning the truth. It is
difficult to think of a non-Hegelian reason for expecting to be mildly
lucky routinely in the required way. Presumably some sort of scalar
gravity could have been true, and gravity would not have bent light
as in GR. The underdetermination case for scalar gravity was not re-
solved, but merely bypassed; but what right would a scientific realist
have to expect such deliverance? The underdetermination case for the
neutrino was resolved, but in such a fashion that the widespread belief
in massless neutrinos was rejected. If the scientific realist is comforted
by the thought that eventually the underdetermination was broken,
there is also a warning that a widely held assumption of massless-
ness has proved false. If the data speak, they might not do so for a
long time, during which interval widespread scientific belief might be
mistaken. The electroweak theory might well permit a mass term for
the photon. Does the scientific realist have good reason to expect a
further unification using a group like SU(5) that blocks such a mass
term?
The no-miracles argument for scientific realism will not help. It
is evident that if a Proca theory for small photon mass (or rather
its quantum successor, here and following) is true, it is not a miracle
that Maxwell’s theory works so well; likewise if Maxwell’s theory is
true, it is no miracle why Proca theories with small photon masses
work so well. The theories are sufficiently alike theoretically as well
as empirically; the no-miracles argument has already done its work.
But what further reasons does the optimistic scientific realist have?
Routine good luck is just the sort of thing that it is not rational to
expect by ordinary (non-Hegelian) inductive principles. One could
perhaps fall back upon the principle that one philosopher’s modus
ponens is another’s modus ponens, or the subjectivity of Bayesian
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prior probabilities, as licensing rational intransigent commitment to
certain strong forms of scientific realism. But surely one ought to
weight the force of the examples from particle physics against the
force of arguments for such optimistic scientific realism. As I read
particle physics, the weight of the examples of underdetermination
above is fairly strong. In any case one must read particle physics in
order to ascertain the force of the examples to be weighed.
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